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A B S T R A C T
International cooperative values and principles are guidelines that could lead cooperatives towards greater
gender equality in the decision-making process. Stimulated by the interest in cooperatives and by the growing
demand for advocating a faster increase in the presence of chairwomen in boardrooms, this research aims to
analyse the impact of the gender of the cooperative president in some variables related to financial and em-
ployment ratios, corporate governance and other characteristics of the organization in Spain. Information about
the major Spanish cooperative entities has been collected and analyzed to carry out the empirical study. We find
that cooperatives with higher liquidity ratio, higher number of employees, higher percentage of female em-
ployees, higher employee costs divided by operating revenue ratio, lower indebtedness, and fewer years since
the appointment of the president have a higher probability of belonging to the group of cooperatives with a
board chaired by a woman. Cooperatives headed by women exhibit a higher ratio of staffing costs to operating
revenues, which could indicate an increased intensity of cooperative principles and values related with the
primacy of the economic welfare of workers over the economic benefits.
1. Introduction
Gender diversity in boardroom and top management positions is
increasingly drawing attention from practitioners, scholars and policy-
makers (Bøhren & Staubo, 2014; Terjesen, Aguilera, & Lorenz, 2015).
Research into the role of women in business reviews its relation with
economic and social fields, among others (Adams & Kirchmaier, 2016;
Daily, Dalton, & Canella, 2003; Francoeur, Labelle, & Sinclair-
Desgagné, 2008; Klettner, Clarke, & Boersma, 2016).
The presence of women on boards and in top management con-
tributes to social and ethical equity by reducing the gender gap. This
implies that the participation of women in boardrooms may be related
on both economic and sociological levels. Beyond the social and ethical
considerations, gender equality may have important implications in
several organizational aspects. For example, previous studies show a
positive effect of the presence of women in decision-making positions
on firm performance (Carter, Simkins, & Simpson, 2003; Catalyst, 2004;
Dezsö & Ross, 2012; Terjesen, Barbosa, & Morais, 2016).
However, despite the substantial advances that organizations have
made over the last decades to increase women representation, their
presence at board level, in general, is still reduced (Kakabadse et al.,
2015).
Women’s participation may vary depending on the type of organi-
zation. In particular, the idiosyncrasies of cooperative companies offer a
favorable context for women’s participation. The International Co-op-
erative Alliance (ICA) established gender equality as a priority for the
cooperative movement in 1995. Accordingly, democratic member
control, one member one vote, and no gender discrimination are some
of the values of cooperative principles. The results of a survey con-
ducted by the International Labour Organization (ILO, 2015) indicate
that cooperatives had improved women’s participation in the labor
market over the last twenty years. Due to its principles, this type of
organization seems to facilitate progress in gender equality more than
other business models (International Labour Office, 2015; Miller,
2011). However, comparing gender relations between capitalist en-
terprises and cooperatives is complicated (Miller, 2011).
Cooperatives have corporate values and principles that make them
particularly suitable for performing actions of corporate social re-
sponsibility in general and particularly so for developing measures for
the real equality of women and men (Senent Vidal, 2011). One of the
advantages of cooperatives for women is that these organizations can
contribute to the social inclusion of women and their empowerment
(Datta & Gailey, 2012). According to Nair and Moolakkattu (2015) “As
many women are forced into the informal labor market, the cooperative
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model provides them an alternative means of coming together and
working collectively” (p. 106). Equally important, the presence of
women leaders in cooperatives may favor the boards’ social orientation
(Périlleux & Szafarz, 2015).
The ICA has developed strategies to promote gender equality as a
global priority, and has set a series of plans of action to address the
issue. According to the International Co-Operative Alliance Asia and
Pacific (2015), one way to eliminate potential, explicit, implicit and
actual gender biases in cooperatives is taking gender equality, which
helps to create a positive environment and improve productivity. At the
International Conference on Enhanced Role of Cooperatives in Re-
covery from the Economic Crisis, held in 2009, three organizations
(International Co-operative Alliance Asia Pacific (ICA), Indian Farmers
Fertilizer Cooperative (IFFCO) and Cooperative League of Thailand
(CLT)), established recommendations so that governments and inter-
national organizations recognize the potential key role of cooperatives
in solving the global economic problems.
One of the main problems of the Spanish economy is unemploy-
ment, especially so for women. In fact, in May 2018, Spain stood at the
foot of the list European countries -surpassed only by Greece- with a
rate of unemployment of 15.4% compared to an average of 6.9% of the
EU-28 (EUROSTAT, 2018). By the same token, unemployment was
higher for women than for men, 17.2% versus 13.8% (EUROSTAT,
2018). Given the unemployment rate in Spain, the analysis in this study
is built on cooperative organizations as a group of firms theoretically
more given to women’s participation. Further, we choose cooperative
firms because of the unique nature of their business model, which may
facilitate gender equality. As in some other countries, Spain has in-
troduced formal regulations on gender equality, which requires female
participation on corporate boards (Organic Act 3/2007 of 22 March, for
effective equality between women (from now on Effective Equality Act
2007)), and nowadays an open debate on the importance of women in
corporate governance has grown. Nevertheless, it is a voluntary mea-
sure, without any penalties for companies that fail to comply.
Regarding cooperatives, Spain has been a pioneer in covering spe-
cific legislation on Social Economy (Law 5/2011, of the 29 of March, on
Social Economy), of which cooperative firms are the most genuine
members. Despite a growing body of literature on women in govern-
ance, studies on the presence of women in boardrooms of cooperatives
in Spain remains a largely uncharted territory in the English-language
literature. For this reason, our findings cover the Spanish context of
gender and cooperatives.
This study addresses how women’s presence as presidents of the
board of directors in cooperatives correlates with several organizational
and financial outputs. Moreover, it contributes to the literature on
board diversity by shedding additional insights on the debate involving
cooperative firms. First, we outline the participation of women on
corporate boards and the gender gap in organizations. We then focus on
the nature of cooperatives and the implications of cooperative princi-
ples in gender equality. This is followed by a review of the participation
of women on corporate boards in the Spanish cooperatives. Next, we
explain the methodology and the main results of the article. In the
concluding section, the results of the study are discussed.
2. Theoretical background
2.1. Gender diversity in top management
This study draws on theories of corporate governance. These ap-
proaches have their roots in the seventies with the theory of agency.
This theory claims that the primary responsibility of the corporate
board is to guarantee the maximization of shareholder value (Jensen &
Meckling, 1976; Jensen, 2001). Terjesen, Sealy, and Singh (2009)
highlighted agency theory, resource dependency, and gender role
theory, as fundamental theories at the firm level to study the gender
diversity contribution to better board effectiveness. From an agency
theory perspective, the presence of women on the board will increase
board independence and improve the board’s monitoring (Carter et al.,
2003).
Moreover, women may bring new perspectives on complex issues
and enhance problem-solving (Francoeur et al., 2008). According to the
resource dependence theory, diversity is an instrument for accessing
unique and valuable resources, such as knowledge and relationships,
crucial to the firm’s success (Terjesen et al., 2016). Moreover, the re-
source-based view emphasizes the diversity as a source of competitive
advantage due to the synergies from the interaction of males and fe-
males (Gallego, García, & Rodríguez, 2010). Gender role theory pro-
poses that gender determines individual behaviour, which is assessed
on its alignment or deviation from expectations of the respective gender
(Eagly, Karau, & Makhijani, 1995). Women are expected to be more
flexible, which allows them to manage ambiguous situations (Rosener,
1995). Francoeur et al. (2008) argue that according to the stakeholder
theory, firms involving female board members will better protect the
interests’ of various stakeholders.
To Abdullah and Valentine (2009) “an effective and good corporate
governance cannot be explained by one theory but it is best to combine
a variation of theories” (p. 94). In the same way, Daily et al. (2003)
point out that “many of these theoretical perspectives are intended as
complements to, not substitutes for, agency theory” (p. 372), which is
the main theoretical framework used in this study.
An extensive theoretical and empirical literature finds significant
relationships in different countries between the most influential profit
organizations and gender diversity on the boards of directors (Carter
et al., 2003).
Previous studies have addressed the role that female directors play
in large listed companies (Mateos, Escot, & Gimeno, 2006; PWC, 2015).
However, notwithstanding the increased relevance of gender diversity
in the boardroom and top management positions, only a few studies
have focused on the gender diversity in the presidency of the boards of
directors of the companies that make up the social economy. In addi-
tion, the drivers of empowerment of chairwomen in non-profit orga-
nizations have been understudied to date. The development of equality
is one of the fundamental cooperative principles established by the
International Cooperative Alliance (International Co-Operative Alliance
(ICA, 1995). Values such as solidarity, equality, predominance of the
individual over capital, and links with the territory make cooperatives
an appropriate business model for women (Arroyo Sánchez, 2011;
Sajardo & Bakaikoa, 2004).
On the contrary, some authors question the supposed ability of
cooperative firms to deal adequately with gender equality compared to
other business models, since observing similarities in gender stratifi-
cation and segregation (Hacker & Elcorobairutia, 1987). Arroyo
Sánchez (2011) analyses the associated labor cooperatives and notes
that a reflection is necessary regarding promotion rules in the work-
place that may lead to gender parity. She also advocates education
based on gender equality. Given these points, as Senent Vidal (2011)
reflects, the role of women in cooperatives is shown as a “blurred and
unfocused photo”. Although the female presence in the corporate
governing bodies of social economy entities is still lower than that of
males, it is generally argued that the cooperative principles and the
nature of these entities make it possible to promote women within the
hierarchical organization (Mateos De Cabo, Iturroiz Del Campo, &
Gimeno Nogués, 2009).
2.2. Cooperatives and women participation in Spain
Spain is an interesting context in which to examine the female
presence on the board in cooperatives for several reasons. Spain has
been one of the first European countries to issue a law promoting board
gender diversity. In 2007, Spain established a recommendation to
achieve greater gender balance on boards of directors of large compa-
nies through the Organic Act 3/2007 of 22 March, for effective equality
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between women (from now on Effective Equality Act 2007).
Additionally, the Spanish social economy, whose main exponent are
cooperatives, generates approximately 10% of the Spanish gross do-
mestic profit and 12.5% of the employment, while 42.8% of the po-
pulation is linked to the Social Economy (CEPES, 2017). By combining
the special features of cooperative firms and the Spanish economy, we
can gain insight into the study of the impact of gender on a wide range
of corporate variables.
In recent years, there has been an increase in the number of studies
on the role of women in the boardrooms of the major Spanish compa-
nies. Recently, Grant-Thornton (2015) showed that there has been
stagnation in the percentage of female board members in Spanish
companies, which has only advanced 5 points, from 22 to 27%, since
2011. According to the European Institute for Gender Equality (2018),
women represent 8.8% of the presidents of companies in Spain, slightly
higher than the European Union (28 countries) average, 7.5%.
Beyond the aforementioned figures, previous studies have failed to
establish evidence about the presence of women as members and as
chairperson of boardrooms in Spanish cooperatives. Some researchers
focus on the territory, others on the sector (Hernández, Martín, &
Mínguez, 2016), while other authors look for differences between
workers’ cooperatives and the rest of cooperatives (Berenguer Contrí
et al., 1999; Fernández Plaza, 2000; Romero & Pérez, 2003). Berenguer
Contrí et al. (1999) analyzed the associated labor cooperatives in the
Valencian Community and found a female presence on the governing
boards of 27.38%. Fernández Plaza (2000) noted that the presence of
women in the cooperatives of the Community of Madrid was 35% of
female board members. Romero and Pérez (2003) found that women
only managed 25% of Andalusian associated labor cooperatives, al-
though they represent one third of the employees. An interesting
synthesis of these studies can be seen in the article of Martínez León,
Arcas Lario, and García Hernández (2011). In this study, they find that
companies from the social economy underutilized the particular style of
female leadership in decision-making. The mentioned authors analyzed
134 social economy organizations, including cooperatives entities and
labor societies, and found that women hold 42.9% of jobs, thus com-
plying with the Spanish Effective Equality Act 2007, but their presence
in decision-making is weak. They observe women partners (29.5%) only
make up 23% of management positions. On the other hand, Elio (2006)
found that in the Basque Country, in the cooperatives of the group
Mondragón Corporación Cooperativa, women held 16% of the positions
in the Governing Councils in 2000. More recently, Hernández et al.
(2016) found that in 2010, in a sample of Spanish cooperatives, the
percentage of women on the board of directors was 13.20%. Also for
the Spanish case, Esteban-Salvador, Gargallo-Castel, and Pérez-Sanz
(2010) observe that the percentage of boardrooms chaired by women
was 11.34%.
Other studies have focused on the agricultural cooperatives; in this
case, Carretero and Avello (2011) found that female participation on
boards is a meagre 3.5%, with 1.75% as presidents, and that on average
they are younger, which may indicate a recent incorporation. Esteban,
Gargallo, and Pérez Sanz (2012) reported 20.9% of directors being
women for a sample of agricultural cooperatives in the province of
Teruel. Recently, Hernández Ortiz, Ruiz Jiménez, García Martí, and
Pedrosa Ortega (2018) analyzed the composition of the board of di-
rectors of the agri-food cooperatives and conclude that, far from
achieving the parity objective, only 22% of the cooperatives have any
female presence on their boards of directors. Balanced boardrooms are
more frequent among younger cooperatives.
Hernández et al. (2016) found that Spanish cooperatives with more
female than male directors have higher profitability and a lower level of
indebtedness. Therefore, the Spanish context is appropriate because of
the importance of the social economy and the interest for gender par-
ticipation in the economic field.
3. Data and methodology
Female presence on board of directors in the Spanish cooperatives
may be related to several characteristics that are interesting to analyze.
With this in mind, this paper poses and tries to ask which variables
related to financial and employment ratios, corporate governance and
other characteristics of the organization are related with the female
gender of the cooperative president in Spain. Identifying variables that
characterize cooperatives chaired by women could help to set up the
profile of organizations that contribute to the development of gender
equality.
The general approach taken here is to model the probability that a
cooperative is chaired by a man (z-chairman) or by a woman (w-
chairwoman) as a function of a group of independent variables mea-
suring employment, performance, liquidity and debt ratios, corporate
governance variables, and firm characteristics. Table 1 shows the list of
independent variables.
3.1. Sample and data sources
The sample used for the study was drawn from the System Iberian
Balance Analysis database (SABI), which holds accounting data on
Spanish companies. The initial sample includes 6419 cooperatives.
Some data clean-up was necessary. Cooperatives that appeared as in-
active have been eliminated, as well as organizations in which it has not
been possible to identify the president. This left a final sample of 2155
cooperatives. The data have been taken between May and June 2016,
and the information of each cooperative corresponds to the most recent
year available in the database, in some companies data came from
December 2015, while in others it came from previous years.
In Table 2 we can see the total number of chairmen and chair-
women. Among the cooperatives in which it is possible to identify the
gender of the president, only 167 are women, representing 7.7% of the
total.
As an essential variable is the percentage of women employed in the
cooperative, we have selected all organizations with data about the
gender of the employees. The sample in the current study initially had
2155 observations and was reduced to 478 after eliminating those
Table 1
Independent variables.
Financial and employment ratios Indebtedness
Liquidity ratio
Return on assets
Profit per employee
Operating revenue per employee
Costs of employees between operating
revenues
Firm characteristics Age of the cooperative
Number of employees
Percentage of female employees
Availability of website
Corporate Governance Board size
Years since the appointment of the president
Number of companies in which the president
has functions
Table 2
Distribution of the presidency by gender.
President Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent
Valid Male 1,988 91.6 92.3 92.3
Female 167 7.7 7.7 100.0
Total 2155 99.3 100.0
Missing system 16 0.7
Total 2171 100.0
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cooperatives without information about the gender of their employees
(Table 3). Finally, the number of cooperatives with information on the
gender the president is 471.
Table 4 contains the descriptive statistics of the independent vari-
ables about the gender of the president.
Return on assets is higher in cooperatives headed by women than in
those presided by men. In both cases, this value is negative (-1.26 and
-1.46, respectively).
Cooperatives chaired by women have more than triple the liquidity
than those headed by men, and the indebtedness ratio in organizations
run by women is 57.75; while this ratio in cooperatives led by men is
65.44. Profit per employee is higher in the cooperatives chaired by men
(5.47) than in those cooperatives presided by women (1.31).
Operating revenue per employee amounted to 771.27 in co-
operatives headed by men and 243.16 in those headed by women.
Employee costs divided by operating revenue is higher in the case of
cooperatives run by women, 38.37 against 20.76.
The average number of employees in cooperatives chaired by
women is 139.68, women chair larger organizations, while men run
cooperatives with an average of 56.28 employees. Regarding gender,
when a woman heads a cooperative, the average number of female
employees is 37%, whereas when a man heads these organizations the
percentage of women is 28%. The average age of the cooperatives
presided over by women is 29.13 years, while organizations headed by
men have an average age of 35.94 years. Cooperatives led by men more
frequently have websites than those run by women (51% and 37% re-
spectively).
Regarding the characteristics of the boards of cooperatives chaired
by women we can see that on average, women head cooperatives in
which the boards are larger than those led by men. The number of
companies in which the president has functions is higher when this
person is male. Finally, the average number of years since the ap-
pointment of the president is higher when women head the boards.
To perform the empirical analysis, we use a binary logistic regres-
sion model. We carried out logit analyses using the statistics package
SPSS, because the dependent variable is a dichotomous variable mea-
suring the gender of the president. We considered this to be one of the
most appropriate statistical techniques for this type of data (Esteban-
Salvador, 2011). We analyse which variables predict whether the pre-
sident of the cooperative is male or female. We examine how a series of
variables influence the likelihood that the president of the company is a
man or a woman. Before starting the analyses, we tested for the possible
existence of linear relationships in each binary logistic regression model
between the independent variables. We carried out logit analyses, using
the IBM SPSS Statistics 22 package, where the dependent variable is a
fictitious variable measuring if the president is a man or a woman.
Thus, we built a model where the dichotomous dependent variable
equals 0 if a man chairs the board of the cooperative, and 1 if a woman
heads it.
Yi =1 Prob(Yi=1)= pi
Yi =0 Prob(Yi=0)=1 − pi
The model is represented as a logistic function whose values range
from 0 to 1:
= + = + = +p e1 e or p 11 e and q 1 11 eZ Z -Z -Z
where p is the probability of success —board chaired by a woman—, q
the probability of failure—board headed by a man—, p+ q=1, and e
is the base of the natural logarithm.
Z is a combination of independent variables:
Z= B0+B1 X1+ B2 X2+· · ·+ Bk Xk
where B0, B1, .. . Bk are the coefficients to estimate from the data and
X1, X2,. . . Xk are the independent variables.
We test the following:
Null Hypothesis: The independent variables (X1, X2, …, X13) do not
significantly influence the dependent variable, the gender of the president of
the cooperative
The larger Z is, the closer p will be to 1, and the more negative Z is,
the closer p will be to 0. When Z=0, p will equal 0.5; in other words,
the probability of being chaired by a man will be the same as the
likelihood of being chaired by a woman. We tried to obtain a linear
combination of the independent variables capable of estimating the
characteristics which impact the probability that a board member be-
longs to a board chaired by a man or by a woman. The linear combi-
nation proposed is the following model:
Table 3
Distribution of the presidency by gender, reduced sample.
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent
Valid 0 433 90.6 91.9 91.9
1 38 7.9 8.1 100.0
Total 471 98.5 100.0
Missing system 7 1.5
Total 478 100.0
Table 4
Characteristics of the Sample. Descriptive.
0= Chairman
1=Chairwoman
N Mean Std. Deviation
Age of the cooperative 0 389 35.94 20.44
1 33 29.13 16.29
Total 422 35.41 20.21
Return on assets 0 433 −1.46 27.10
1 38 −1.26 19.18
Total 471 −1.45 26.53
Liquidity ratio 0 432 2.16 4.28
1 38 6.94 26.19
Total 470 2.55 8.52
Indebtedness ratio 0 433 65.44 42.77
1 38 57.75 39.12
Total 471 64.82 42.50
Operating revenue per employee 0 425 771.27 2906.35
1 36 243.16 429.01
Total 461 730.03 2796.41
Costs of employees between revenues 0 433 20.76 63.85
1 38 38.37 53.80
Total 471 22.18 63.23
Total employees 0 433 56.28 128.97
1 38 139.68 506.05
Total 471 63.01 189.65
% female employees 0 433 28 0.25
1 38 37 0.32
Total 471 28 0.26
Years since the appointment of the
president
0 383 10.56 13.25
1 35 10.59 18.91
Total 418 10.56 13.78
Number of companies in which the
president has functions
0 433 2.03 2.01
1 38 1.55 1.31
Total 471 1.99 1.96
Board size 0 433 2.77 2.51
1 38 2.89 3.48
Total 471 2.78 2.59
Profit per employee 0 425 5.47 30.16
1 36 1.31 28.01
Total 461 5.15 29.99
Web=1 no web=0 0 433 0.51 0.50
1 38 0.37 0.49
Total 471 0.50 0.50
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Z= B0+ B1 Liquidity ratio+ B2 Indebtedness ratio+ B3 Return on
assets+ B4 Profit per employee+ B5 Operating revenue per
employee+ B6 Costs of employees between operating revenues+ B7
Age of the cooperative+ B8 Number of employees+ B9 Percentage of
female employees+ B10 Website+ B11Years since the appointment of
the president+ B12 Board size+ B13 Number of companies in which
the president has functions
After carrying out the multicollinearity analyses, we observed that
the diagnostics did not show either very low tolerance values or var-
iance inflation factors greater than 10 in any variable (Chatterjee &
Hadi, 2012). In addition, the condition index does not exceed 15
(Tables 5 and 6 report the results of these analyses). Therefore, there
are no problems of multicollinearity.
Thus, we built a model to identify the influence and contribution of
certain financial ratios, some board variables and several characteristics
of the firm to the probability of having a chairman or a chairwoman. If
the value is greater than or equal to 0.5, the probability that the firm
has a chairwoman will be high, while if the value is less than 0.5, the
probability that the firm has a chairman will be high.
4. Results
This section presents the results obtained in the model of gender
diversity of the presidency of the Spanish cooperative boards. Logistic
binary regression has been performed to assess the impact of several
variables on the likelihood that the chair of the board of directors of the
cooperative is male or female. The model contained 13 independent
variables related to financial and employment ratios, corporate gov-
ernance and cooperative characteristics.
When performing logistic regression analysis, 1928 of the 2171
cooperatives existing in the sample were lost due to the lack of in-
formation for all the variables. The final number of selected cases in-
cluded in the logistic regression analysis was 365 cooperatives
(Table 7).
The full model containing all predictors was statistically significant,
Chi-square (18, N= 365)=40.713, p < 0.01, indicating that the
model was able to distinguish between cooperatives with chairman and
chairwoman. The model as a whole explained between 10.6% (Cox &
Snell R Square) and 25.2% (Nagelkerke R Square) of the variance, and
correctly classified 93.2% of cases.
As shown in Table 8, four of the independent variables make a
statistically significant contribution to the model. We find that liquidity
ratio, the number of years since the appointment of the president, in-
debtedness ratio, employee costs divided by operating revenues, the
Table 5
Partial Regression coefficients and tolerance levels.
Coefficients
Model Collinearity Statistics
Tolerance VIF
1 (Constant)
Web=1 no web=0 0.81 1.24
Age of the cooperative 0.88 1.13
Return on assets 0.48 2.08
Liquidity ratio 0.95 1.06
Indebtedness ratio 0.49 2.03
Profit per employee 0.89 1.12
Costs of employees between operating revenues 0.85 1.18
Average cost of employees 0.95 1.05
Total employees 0.81 1.23
% female employees 0.92 1.08
Board size 0.88 1.13
Years since the appointment of the president 0.93 1.08
Number of companies in which the president has
functions
0.94 1.06
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number of employees and the percentage of female employees are
significantly associated with the gender of the president.
The model provides six statistically significant variables, one of
them has a p < 0.001, this variable is employee costs divided by op-
erating revenues. By examining the sign of the logistic regression
coefficient (B) we find a positive association between liquidity ratio,
number of employees, the percentage of female employees and em-
ployee costs divided by operating revenues and gender of the president.
The higher the liquidity ratio, number of employees, and percentage of
female employees, the higher the likelihood of a woman being the
president. On the other hand, we find a negative association between
indebtedness, and years since the appointment of the president and the
chairperson. This result is consistent with the slight improvement, al-
beit slow, produced in recent years in the inclusion of women in top-
managerial positions, which means that the more recent the appoint-
ment of the president the higher probability that the chair is a woman.
Looking at the values and signs of the coefficients in the equation,
the results show that the chances of belonging to the group of co-
operative chaired by women are higher among those firms with higher
values in the liquidity ratio, more employees, higher percentage of fe-
male employees, higher employee costs divided by operating revenues,
lower indebtedness, and fewer years since the appointment of the
president. The rest of the variables introduced in the model appear not
to make a significant contribution to the prediction of having a woman
as president. Variables such as return on assets or profit per employee
have no statistically significant relationship with the president's gender.
In this sense, it is necessary to take into account that cooperatives are
non-profit enterprises, whose purpose is to maximize social returns,
rather than economic profit maximisation, regardless of the chair's
gender of the cooperative. This could be a possible explanation of why
these variables are indifferent to the chair's gender.
5. Discussion and conclusions
This article represents a step forward in linking two research topics,
gender empowerment, and research on cooperative firms. Cooperative
principles and values offer a unique context to gender equality.
Moreover, diversity may provide opportunities to increase perfor-
mance. These assumptions show a gap in the current debate related to
the role women empowerment plays in cooperatives. To address this
gap, we review the literature and empirically analyse the potential re-
lationship between these variables. The current article sought to find
out what variables predict the probability that a man or a woman chair
a cooperative. The results of the study confirm and extend the findings
from the sparse literature. Cooperatives with higher liquidity ratio, a
higher number of employees, higher percentage of female employees,
higher employee costs divided by operating revenue ratio, lower in-
debtedness, and fewer years since the appointment of the president
have a higher probability of belonging to the group of cooperatives with
a board chaired by a woman. Here our findings partially support the
results of previous studies. Hernández et al. (2016) suggest that co-
operatives with a higher percentage of female directors show a lower
level of indebtedness. In general, women are considered more risk
averse (Borghans, Heckman, Golsteyn, & Meijers, 2009), female CEOs
tend to reduce the corporate risk-taking (Faccio, Marchica, & Mura,
2016) and women entrepreneurs tend to make greater use of equity and
less debt (Orser, Riding, & Manley, 2006).
Some studies report correlations between the size of firms and the
presence of women on corporate boards (Hyland & Marcellino, 2002;
Terjesen et al., 2016). The higher number of employees and the higher
cost of employees by operating revenues may suggest that female par-
ticipation on corporate boards could improve the labor conditions in
cooperative firms (Fregidou Malama, 2004) and fringe benefits (Rand &
Tarp, 2011). The size effect seems to be related to the firm size, but not
to the board dimension. The percentage of female employees has also
been previously considered an important facilitator for female partici-
pation on the board of directors of the cooperatives (Carretero & Avello,
2011; Mateos, Gimeno, & Escot, 2011).
Age of the cooperative is not found to be significant in the analysis.
Nevertheless, the higher presence of female directors in those co-
operatives where the appointment of the president has been more re-
cent indicated a slight change of tendency in the participation of
women in business (Esteban-Salvador et al., 2010). Hernandez et al.
(2018) do not have information about the time of the appointment of
the president, but they do find a greater tendency to gender parity
among younger cooperatives.
The results of the empirical study provide new evidence on gender
diversity on decision-making bodies in organizations and illustrate the
importance of corporate governance issues for cooperative enterprises
in Spain. Furthermore, information about the presidency of the gov-
ernance boards regarding gender is provided in order to highlight the
role of women in the Spanish cooperative business model. This is
especially interesting in a country which is a pioneer both of equality
and of social economy legislation (Effective Equality Act 2007; Law 5/
2011, of 29 March, on Social Economy). These analyses also allow the
detection of differences in behaviour patterns between both men and
women in democratic organizations.
The result of employee costs divided by operating revenue ratio is
interesting from the perspective of the corporate values and principles
of cooperatives. It could mean that cooperatives headed by women
could have higher personnel costs, perhaps because they hire more
people. If this were so, we could say from a stakeholder’s perspective
that cooperatives headed by women focus more on the economic wel-
fare of their workers than on achieving economic benefits. According to
the stakeholder theory, the purpose of a business is to create value not
only for shareholders, but, in general, for stakeholders (Freeman, 2008;
Harrison, Bosse, & Phillips, 2010). As Périlleux and Szafarz (2015) in-
dicate, women leaders may favor the social orientation of cooperative
Table 7
Case Processing Summary.
Case Processing Summary
Unweighted Cases N Percent
Selected Cases Included in Analysis 365 76.4
Missing Cases 113 23.6
Total 478 100.0
Unselected Cases 0 0.0
Total 478 100.0
Table 8
Results of logistic regression analysis.
B S.E. Wald Exp(B)
Age of the cooperative −0.016 0.014 1.196 0.985
Liquidity ratio 0.027** 0.014 3.795 1.027
Board size 0.033 0.083 0.157 1.033
Years since the appointment of the
president
−0.102** 0.050 4.214 0.903
Number of companies in which the
president has functions
−0.068 0.148 0.215 0.934
Indebtedness −0.013* 0.008 2.842 0.987
Costs of employees between operating
revenues
0.029*** 0.009 10.306 1.030
Average cost of employees −0.008 0.012 0.432 0.992
Number of employees 0.001* 0.001 2.712 1.001
Percentage of female employees 1.339* 0.785 2.907 3.816
Return on assets 0.013 0.026 0.254 1.013
Website 0.731 0.511 2.049 2.077
Profit per employee 0.011 0.007 2.019 1.011
Constant −2.012** 1.019 3.898 0.134
* p < 0.10.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.001.
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boards. Moreover, the organizational model of cooperative firms is
supposed to place people into the midst of the firms’ operations.
Other studies found that the average wage of the cooperative or-
ganizations was lower than the average wage of capitalist firms
(Clemente, Diaz-Foncea, Marcuello, & Sanso-Navarro, 2012; Pencavel,
Pistaferri, & Schivardi, 2006), others indicated that cooperatives, in
particular associated worker’s cooperatives, may have incentives to
increase wages and other labor rewards (Arruñada, 1998), because
according to the agency theory the conflicts of interest between owners
and workers will disappear in these cooperatives. In cooperatives, social
benefits should take preference over financial gain. However, it is ne-
cessary to take into account that the guarantee of the survival of the
cooperative will increase if, in addition to the social benefits, economic
profit is achieved. In this study, we do not find significant results on
other variables pertaining to the economic performance, such as return
on assets or profit per employee. This indicates that economic perfor-
mance is not related to the chances of belonging to the group of co-
operatives chaired by women. These results are in line with those of
some that find a negative relationship between the presence of women
on the boardroom and performance (Bøhren & Strøm, 2006; Pelled,
Eisenhardt, & Xing, 1999; Shrader, Blackburn, & Iles, 1997), or others
that do not obtain a statistically significant relationship (Miller &
Triana, 2009; Rose, 2007; Zahra & Stanton, 1988).
To our knowledge, there are not any studies that analyse differences
depending on the gender of the head of the board. The results con-
tribute to the emergent dialogue on the significant and important role
that female presence on the board play on governance. The article also
serves to reinforce the theoretical and practical implications of findings
from studies on cooperatives. Nevertheless, we should consider the
limitations of the study, mainly its focus on the cooperative firms. In
light of this, we should be cautious about generalizing the findings
without the opportunity to compare our results with those of studies on
capitalist firms. Such studies are of interest for subsequent research.
In this study, we showed the small number of women holding the
position of chairperson of the board –only in the 7.7% of the co-
operatives in the sample–. The reasons appear to lie in the fact that,
despite the principle of non-discrimination in cooperative organiza-
tions, they carry out their activities in a context influenced by tradi-
tions, stereotypes and the distinctive culture of the society (Carretero &
Avello, 2011; Grant-Thornton, 2015; Ribas Bonet & Sajardo Moreno,
2004). Although women’s representation on supervisory boards is
gradually increasing (Holst & Kirsch, 2014), there is still a significant
gap between the proportion of employed women and those sitting on
the boards of directors. On the other hand, it is difficult to conclude
whether it is the female presidency of the boards which determines the
analyzed aspects or whether these factors explain the higher propensity
to incorporate women in the presidency of the boards. This paper offers
a starting point to investigate the relationship between gender partici-
pation on corporate boards and cooperative characteristics. Our results
provide a broad view of this relationship and serve as useful evidence
for future research on social economy firms. The study has some lim-
itations, given that showing the relevance of the representation of
women in cooperative corporate boards is not the same as explaining
how cooperatives promote gender equality. As a result, more research is
needed on the presence of women on corporate boards of directors in
these organizations. The development of this idea could be an extension
of this research in the future. Furthermore, future research projects
should investigate differences that emerge from the cooperative model
and other managerial models.
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